Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Kay Gneiting; Kerry Rick Hubble; and Wilderness
Building Systems, Inc., a Utah Corporation v.
Dennis Blaine Vance : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Lawrence R. Dingivan; Purser, Edwards & Shields; attorney for appellant.
Kent L. Christiansen; Christiansen & Sonntag; attorney for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Gneiting v. Vance, No. 950342 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6676

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK HUBBLE;
and WILDERNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS,
INC., a Utah Corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiffs
and Appellees

Case No. 950342-CA

vs.
DENNIS BLAINE VANCE,
Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant.

-?5D3</at#

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
In and For Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Argument Priority Classification 15
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (#2948)
LAWRENCE R. DINGIVAN (#5193)
Attorney for Third Party
Defendant/Appellant
PURSER EDWARDS & SHIELDS
215 South State Street
800 Parkside Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-3555
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN, ESQ.
Attorney for Third-Party
Plaintiffs/Appellees
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG
420 East South Temple, No. 345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-3762

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

AUG 2 4 1995

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
i

»

»

»

i

*-

Statement of the Issues and Standard ul Review . . . . . . .

1

Determinative Laws 01 bLaluli*

2

ft

mi i IK

i

,ISP

.

. .

2

Statement of Relevant Facts
Summary of the Arqumen'
A r «;)uiii«»i'i»

m

r

.

POINT J:

roil IT

...

IT:

3

....*........,
,

,

.

4

,

5

I1" DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION
TO ACT ON THE "COUNTERMOTION FOR
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES" . ,

5

THE DISTRICT COURT'S OCTOBER 20r 1 994
f

JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED CONTRARY TO I „,fi W

Conclusion and Relief Sought

, .

ei H i j t c a t e oi M a i l i n g

„ . . . .

i

7

C

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Atkinr Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel..
709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985)

7

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.r
860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993)

7

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.r
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)

7

Higgins v. Salt Lake County.
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)

2

Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co..
817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah App. 1991)

6-7

Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc..
891 F.2d 886, 890 (11th Cir. 1990)

6

EXHIBITS
1.

Judgement, October 20, 1994,
Third Judicial District Court

Exhibit "A

Transcript, proceedings before
the Third Judicial District Court,
August 18, 1994

Exhibit "B

Third-Party Plaintiffs' Memorandum
in Response to Third-Party Defendant
Dennis Vance's Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and Counterclaim for
Compensatory Damages, November 1, 1994

ii/^i H
Exhibit "C

Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, March 13, 1995

Exhibit "D

5.

Amended Judgment, March 13, 1995

II17 II
Exhibit "E'

6.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52

Exhibit "F"

7.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59

Exhibit "G"

2.

3.

4.

ii

n A it

II D "

ii n i l

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK HUBBLE;
and WILDERNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS,
INC. f a Utah Corporation,

]

Third-Party Plaintiffs
and Appellees

]\

vs.

]

DENNIS BLAINE VANCE,

Case No. 950342-CA

]

Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it

heard the Countermotion for Compensatory Damages under Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e).
2.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it

amended its Findings of Fact and Judgment under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(b).

1

3.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it

originally awarded punitive damages against Dennis Vance without
also awarding compensatory damages.
Each of these issues presents a question of law.

The

standard of review for questions of law is the "correctness" in
which no particular difference is given to the trial court's
ruling on questions of law, Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231, 235 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE LAWS OR STATUTES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 6(a) and (b), 52(b), and
59(e).
NATURE OF THE CASE
The litigation underlying this appeal stems from an action
to quiet title to a parcel of real property in the Summit Park
subdivision in Wasatch County.

The plaintiffs in the trial court

(the "Robinsons"), who are not parties to this appeal, brought an
action in fraud, among other claims, against Kay Gneiting, Kerry
Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. (collectively,
the "Hubble Plaintiffs"), alleging that the Hubble Plaintiffs
participated in a scheme to deprive the Plaintiffs of their
interest in the Summit Park property.

In turn, the Hubble

Plaintiffs brought suit against Mr. Dennis Vance, the Appellant
before this Court, claiming that Mr. Vance had initiated the

2

allegedly fraudulent scheme without their knowledge.

On August

18, 1994, following a one-day trial to the bench, the Honorable
Homer Wilkinson ruled orally that the Hubble Plaintiffs were
liable to the Robinsons for compensatory and punitive damages and
that Mr. Vance was liable to the Hubble Plaintiffs for punitive
damages only.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On October 20, 1994 the District Court entered its judgment
awarding the Hubble Plaintiffs $24,780.56 in punitive damages
against Mr. Vance. See Exhibit "A" to this Brief.

Consistent

with the Court's oral ruling of August 18, 1994, the Judgment did
not include any award of compensatory damages in favor of the
Plaintiffs and against Mr. Vance.

See Exhibit "Bff to this Brief

(Transcript, Proceedings before the Third Judicial District
Court, August 18, 1995) at 6-7.
On November 1, 1994, the Hubble Plaintiffs filed with the
District Court moving papers which they captioned in relevant
part "Countermotion for Compensatory Damages." (The
"Countermotion") See Exhibit "C" to this Brief. In the
Countermotion, the Hubble Plaintiffs acknowledge that the
District Court's October 20, 1994 Judgment which awarded only
punitive damages against Mr. Vance must be amended because "in
addition to the award for punitive damages, they are entitled to
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compensatory damages against Third-Party Defendant Vance, and
that existing law dictates that compensatory damages be awarded
incident to an award of punitive damages." Countermotion at 3.
Mr. Vance filed a written response to the Countermotion and the
District Court conducted a hearing in the matter on January 13,
1995.
On March 13, 1995 the District Court entered its "Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," see Exhibit "D" to this
Brief, and a corresponding "Amended Judgment," see Exhibit "E" to
this Brief, on the docket.

In the Amended Judgment, and based on

the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the District
Court concluded that Mr. Vance was liable to the Hubble
Plaintiffs for various sums of compensatory damages and prejudgment interest.

The Amended Judgment also reiterated the

Court's October 20, 1994 award of punitive damages.

On April 11,

1995, Mr. Vance timely filed this appeal from the Amended
Judgment.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The argument set out below attacks the District Court's dual
Judgments against Mr. Vance in reverse chronological order.

It

first shows that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
conduct the proceedings that led to the March 13, 1995 Amended
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Judgement.

As a result, the Amended Judgment is void within the

meaning of Utah law and therefore of no force or effect.
The argument then addresses the validity of the District
Court's original Judgment, a ruling entered on the docket of that
court on October 20, 1994. By reference to the transcript of the
proceedings in which that Judgment was framed, the text of the
October 20 Judgment itself, and by citation to governing
decisional law, the argument demonstrates that the Judgment,
while not void, is contrary to law and may not stand.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ACT
ON THE "COUNTERMOTION FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES"
By their Countermotion, the Hubble Plaintiffs attempted to
invoke the District Court's authority to amend its October 20,
1995 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its Judgment of
the same date.

Indeed, the Hubble Plaintiffs appear to have

succeeded in their procedural gambit because on January 13, 1995,
the District Court heard argument on the Countermotion and on
March 13, 1995, issued its Amended Judgment and Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Whatever the Hubble Plaintiffs

may believe they achieved by submission of the Countermotion, all
of their efforts were in vain.

5

Under Utah law, a trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are amended pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(b).

Similarly, a trial court's final judgment may

be amended pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
Unfortunately for the Hubble Plaintiffs, both Rule 52 and 59
fasten a tether to the District Court's authority to hear motions
brought under either rule.

Rule 52 declares that any motion

seeking an amendment of findings of fact and a corresponding
amendment of the judgment must be brought within ten days of the
allegedly defective judgment. See Exhibit "F" to this Brief.
Correspondingly, Rule 59(e) states that "[a] motion to alter or
amend the judgment shall be served not later than ten days after
entry of the judgment." See Exhibit "G" to this Brief.
The Hubble Plaintiffs' Countermotion was both filed with the
District Court and served on opposing counsel on November 1,
1994.

But the judgment to which the Countermotion related was

docketed with the District Court on October 20, 1994, twelve days
earlier.

The Hubble Plaintiffs' failure to timely file the

Countermotion erected a jurisdictional bar to the District Court
considering the Countermotion and acting on it to amend the
October 20, 1994 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment. Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc.r 891 F.2d 886, 890
(11th Cir. 1990).

Where a District Court lacks jurisdiction over
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the subject matter before it, its judgment is void. Rjchins yt
Delbert Chipman & Son's Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah App. 1991).
As a result, the March 13, 1995 Amended Judgment is a nullity and
may not be enforced against Mr. Vance.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S OCTOBER 20, 1994
JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED CONTRARY TO LAW
As every party to the proceedings in the District Court
concedes and as the transcript of the District Court's August 18,
1994 proceedings puts beyond good faith dispute, the District
Court's original judgment against Mr. Vance and in favor of the
Hubble Plaintiffs was for punitive damages only.

Such a

judgment, while not "void" within the meaning of Richinsr supra,
is nonetheless directly contrary to Utah decisional law in point
and may not stand. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.r 860 P.2d 937
(Utah 1993); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.f 817 P.2d 789 (Utah
1991); Atkinr Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel.r 709 P.2d
330, 337 (Utah 1985).

As a result, this Court must vacate the

judgment and remand this case to the District Court for a new
trial.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the District Court lacked jurisdiction to act on the
Counterclaim, the Court's Amended Judgment of March 13, 1995 is
void and must be stricken by this Court.
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Moreover, because the

District Court's October 20, 1995 judgment against Mr. Vance is
contrary to Utah law, it to must be vacated by this Court.

To

date there has been no proper resolution of the merits of the
Hubble Plaintiffs' claims against Mr. Vance and Mr. Vance's
defenses to those claims.

Accordingly, this Court must vacate

the entirety of the proceedings against Mr. Vance and direct the
District Court to conduct a new trial in this matter.
DATED this ^->

day of August, 1995.
PURSER EDWARDS & SHIELDS, L.L.C.

^

Jeffrey Weston Shie]
Lawrence R. Dingivar
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the c__

day of August, 1995, I

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, and addressed to:
Kent L. Christiansen, Esq.
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG
420 East South Temple, No. 345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Attorneys for Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LEON W. ROBINSON and
ARLENE ROBINSON,

VJUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants,

Civil No. 920902754

KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

DENNIS VANCE,
Third Party Defendant.

JL
Deputy Clerk

Judge Homer *F. Wilkinson

This matter came on regularly before the Court for a non-jury trial on the Third-Party
Complaint filed by Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, against Third-Party
Defendant, Dennis Vance, on June 1, 1994, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District
Court Judge, presiding; and was again before the court for a hearing on Third-Party Plaintiffs'
Motion for Clarification of Judgment Against Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance on September
23, 1994. Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm of Christiansen & Sonntag, appeared on behalf
of the Third-Party Plaintiffs, Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. Scott
Mitchell of the law firm of Lehman, Mitchell & Waldo, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs,
Leon and Arlene Robinson (hereinafter "Robinsons"). Dennis Vance, Third-Party Defendant,
appeared pro se. The parties having adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary
exhibits, and having argued the matter to the Court, and the Court having reviewed the file,
exhibits, and memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court having entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, the Court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause
appearing therefore, it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment upon the merits be entered
in favor of the Third-Party Plaintiffs Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc.,
and against Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance, in the amount of $24,780.56, together with
interest thereon as allowed by Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-4.
DATED this^ * day of October, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

- 7 ^ - T-^hz^^
/
/

__

Homer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge

0(\d?l

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment by
placing a true and correct copy thereof in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this L> day of
October, 1994, and properly addressed as follows:
Scott B. Mitchell
LEHMAN, MITCHELL & WALDO
An Association of Sole Proprietorships
Kearns Building, Suite 721
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dennis Vance
7702 West 13090 South
Herriman, Utah 84065

ly&W/ WfictAt

00422

TabB

SEP
By
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Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR

1

21

SALT LAKE COUNTY,

31

*

41 LEON W. ROBINSON,

5

61

Plaintiff,

1

7

-vs-

*

H3F

Case No. 920902754 CV

KAY GNEITING, et al.,

81

*

STATE OF UTAH

DECISION, 8-18-94

Defendant.
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1

10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 18th day

11
12

of August, 1994, at 10:30 o'clock a.m., this cause

13

came on for telephone conference before the HONORABLE

14

HOMER WILKINSON, District Court, without a jury in

15

the Salt Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City,

16

Utah.

17
18

A P P E A R A N C E S :

19

For the Plaintiff:

SCOTT MITCHELL
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

DENNIS VANCE
Pro Se

20
21
22
23
24
25

CAT by:

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Okay,

counsel,

we a r e

on

the record.
We have Scott Mitchell, are you there?
MR. MITCHELL:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Kent Christiansen, are you

there?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And Dennis Vance, are you

MR. VANCE:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

I'm calling regarding the

there?

case of Leon W. Robinson versus Kerry Rick Hubble and
others, and Kerry Rick Hubble and others versus
Dennis Vance.
I want to give you my decision
regarding the question of punitive damages.
The Court would find in favor of the
Plaintiff, the Robinsons, and against Kerry Rick
Hubble and Wilderness Building on the punitive
damages.

And would also find in favor of the Third

Party Plaintiffs, Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness
Building against Dennis Vance.
The Court would award to the Defendants
the sum of $49,561.12 as punitive damages.

nm^7

The Court would find and award to the

1
2

Third Party Plaintiff against the Third Party

3

Defendant the sum of $24,780.56 as punitive damages.
Now, I'm going to give you some —

4

the

5

reasoning behind my ruling, the findings of fact.

6

would expect, counsel, for you to supplement these

7

more in detail as far as what I'm referring to.
I would ask that, Mr. Mitchell, you

8
9

I

prepare the pleadings for your case, and,

10

Mr. Christiansen, you prepare the pleadings for your

11

case.

12

The Court would find that the actions

13

of the defendant, Kerry Rick Hubble and the

14

Wilderness Building Systems, manifested knowing,

15

reckless indifference and disregard towards the

16

rights of others; that they were willful, knowingly

17

and even malicious in some aspects, in that the

18

Defendant indicated, testified, that he would —

19

not feel that he owed the money to the Plaintiffs and

20

was almost prepared to do anything to get out of

21

paying the same; that the —

22

let me -- that's fine there.

23

and also —

did

well, no,

And the relative wealth of the

24

Defendants indicate that the Wilderness Building has

25

a gross income, based on the income tax returns that
3

ll

are filed —

2

definitely the amounts, but find that they have

3

sufficient incomes to pay a judgment of this sort;

4

and that Hubble also has sufficient income.

5

though Hubble's income is less than the —

6

been referred to in the income tax as $18,750, that

7

he's had many years to pay on this.

8

penalizing him for taking out bankruptcy.

9

right that he had# but that he has done nothing to

10
11

and I'm not finding that this is

--

is

And even

what has

I am not
That's a

pay off this judgment.
That the nature of the conduct --

12

Hubble caused a new action to be filed and a

13

foreclosure of the real property.

14

get involved in it so that the -- alleged that the

15

mortgage had been filed wrong on it.

16

property was sold as being owned by Gneiting.

17

then the money was, of course, paid over to Hubble.

18

And all this was done knowingly and fraudulently

19

against the concerns of the Plaintiff; that this has

20

had a very devastating affect on the lives of the

21

Plaintiff in that they have had to file bankruptcy,

22

that they have lost items/ had to forego many items

23

as a result of the judgment not being paid and the

24

loss of which they have had.

25

He had Gneiting

And the
And

As far as the probability of future

nnoco

reoccurrence of the misconduct, we see that Hubble is
still in business, Wilderness is still in business.
They are still building homes.
do this.

They can continue to

And there is a likelihood that it could be

a reoccurrence because there seems to be no
dependence on the part of Hubble or Wilderness
indicating that they did anything wrong in the first
instance.
The relationship of the parties in the
the original instance was a principal relationship of
where the Plaintiffs did trust Hubble and Wilderness
to build a home for them and that they were taken
advantage of and a judgment resulted in the 27,000
figure.
Based on that, I would find in favor of
the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the
amount indicated.
MR. MITCHELL:

Scott Mitchell, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

What is your question?

MR. MITCHELL:

I caught the amount

49,500 and something, but I didn't catch the end of
it.
THE COURT:

It was $49,561.12 or two

times the amount of the actual damages.
5

MR. MITCHELL:

Very good.

Thank you,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

And the Court would find as

far, as the Third Party Plaintiff was concerned, that
the Third Party Defendant, Dennis Vance, engineered
much of this scheme, that he retained —

or I

shouldn't say "retained" -- that he contacted the
attorney to carry this out; that the attorneys knew
nothing about the scheme that was being set up; that
Vance knew what was going on; that he told the
parties that he was going to set up a system where
they wouldn't have to pay it.
ahead.

Hubble let him go

Hubble knowingly allowed him to do it.

Vance proceeded to do it.

And

And, therefore, of course,

and based on that, I'm finding that Vance is liable,
also, but that he's not liable for the full amount,
but that Hubble should be liable for the 49, but
Vance should be liable for 27 -- one half of that,
$24,780.56 is awarded to Hubble against Vance.
Any questions?
MR. MITCHELL:

None from me, your

Honor.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
Christiansen.
is:

Your Honor, Kent

The only question that I would have

Does the Court make any specific finding on the

nftiR l

1

effect of Kerry Rick Hubble's bankruptcy?

2

THE COURT:

No.

I think that was

3

resolved in the motion for summary judgment.

4

review the law, that the bankruptcy court did not

5

avoid the lien on the property, that the lien passed

6

through the bankruptcy, the bankruptcy did not take

7

the property at all.

8

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

The lien last remained on

10

the property, and it / s something that can be

11

foreclosed.

12

being renewed, then there would be a different

13

question.

14
15

As I

It is not being renewed.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

If it was

Okay, thanks, I

appreciate that clarification.

16

THE COURT:

Mr. Vance, any questions?

17

MR. VANCE:

There's no compensatory

18

damages.

19

the Third Party Plaintiff; is that correct?

20

There's punitive damages against me from

THE COURT:

Yes, punitive damages,

22

MR. VANCE:

Okay, I understand.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

21

24
25

only.

If, counsel, will

you prepare the pleadings as I have indicated to you?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Thank you, your

Honor.
MR. MITCHELL:

Very g o o d .

Thank

you,

your Honor.
(Hearing

adjourned.)

8
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH
County of SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

I, CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, do hereby certify
that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary
Public in and for the State of Utah;
That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at
the time and place therein named and thereafter
reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided
transcription (CAT) under my direction and control;
I further certify that I have no interest in
the event of this action.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this the 19th day of
August, 1994.

(Signature)
CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR.
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Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LEON W. ROBINSON and
ARLENE ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants,

THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE
TO THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
DENNIS VANCE'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT
AND COUNTERMOTION FOR
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES^

Civil No. 920902754

KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

DENNIS VANCE,
Third Party Defendant.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

/

Third-Party Plaintiffs, Kerry Rick Hubble, and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., a
Utah corporation, by and through their attorney, Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm
Christiansen & Sonntag, and pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, hereby responds to the Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Blaine Vance's Motion
to Set Aside Judgment, and submits this Countermotion requesting that this honorable court enter
judgment for compensatory damages against Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance in conjunction
with the award for punitive damages previously entered in this matter. In response to Vance's
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, and in support of their Countermotion, said Third-party
Plaintiffs respectfully submit as follows:
1.

A trial was held on the Third-Party Complaint against Dennis Vance on June 1,

1994. At the close of that trial, and pursuant to the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint,
Third-Party Plaintiffs requested that the court enter judgment against Third-Party Defendant
Vance in the amount of $24,780.56 compensatory damages, together with pre-judgment interest
in the amount of $16,583.97, plus interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent from April 21,
1993-the same amount the court awarded the Robinsons against Defendants and Third-Party
Plaintiffs Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems. Third-Party Plaintiffs also sought an award
of damages on their conversion claim in the amount of $9,800.00, plus punitive damages against
Defendant Vance.
2.

As a result of the evidence presented at trial, the court granted Third-Party

Plaintiffs judgment for punitive damages against Dennis Vance in the amount of $24,780.56.
No amount for compensatory damages was included in the judgment.
3.

The evidence supports the fact, and the court so found, that Third-Party Plaintiffs
-2-

were damaged by the willful and malicious acts of Dennis Vance. As a direct and proximate
result of Vance's actions, Third-Party Plaintiffs have been damaged in that judgment was entered
against them and in favor of the Plaintiffs for compensatory damages totalling $41,364.53 plus
interest at twelve percent (12%) from April 21, 1993.
4.

Movants herein respectfully submit that in addition to the award for punitive

damages, they are entitled to compensatory damages against Third-Party Defendant Vance, and
that existing law dictates that compensatory damages be awarded incident to an award of punitive
damages. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Atkin Wright & Miles
v. Mountain States Tel.. 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985); Maw v. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District. 436 P.2d 230 (Utah 1968); Graham v. Street. 270 P.2d 456 (Utah 1954).
5.

Further, the evidence at trial was undisputed that Third-Party Plaintiffs had been

damaged in the amount of $9,000.00 for the Third-Party Defendant's wrongful conversion of
their property. Accordingly, Third-Party Plaintiffs request that the judgment against Vance also
include the $9,000.00 damage related to the conversion of the property belonging to Wilderness
Building Systems, Inc. Again, evidence on the issue of compensatory damages for conversion
against Defendant Vance in the Third-Party Complaint, was presented and not refuted at the time
of trial. Therefore, Third-Party Plaintiffs submit that the evidence supports a finding on the fifth
cause of action against Defendant Vance for judgment in the amount of $9,800.00, plus recovery
of the $816.00 Third-Party Plaintiffs paid to Defendant Vance to perform work related to
collection of their accounts, which he never did.
WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiffs respectfully request that Third-Party Defendant's
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment be denied, and that the court enter judgment for compensatory
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damages against Dennis Vance consistent with those rendered against Defendants Hubble and
Wilderness Building Systems in the amount of $24,780.56, plus $16,583.97 for a total of
$41,364.53, plus interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) from April 21, 1993; for
compensatory damages on Third-Party Plaintiffs conversion claim in the amount of $9,800.00;
and for damages against Defendant Vance for his breach of the services contract and the $816.00
paid to him for work on lot J-63.
DATED this

I^J

day of November, 1 9 9 ^
CHRISTD

DJNNTAG

;N

ill
mi L.l Christiansen' /
ijttornej fqr/Third-Pariy Plaintiffs
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Third-Party Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Response to Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance's Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and Countermotion for Compensatory Damages was mailed, postage prepaid this
day of November, 1994, to the following:
Michael G. Barker, Esq.
56 E. Broadway, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Scott B. Mitchell, Esq.
LEHMAN, MITCHELL & WALDO
An Association of Sole Proprietorships
Kearns Building, Suite 721
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Kay Gneiting
8194 South 2470 West
West Jordan, Utah 84088

Lt\iUL lli^U
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KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN of
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG
345 IBM Plaza
420 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-3762
Attorneys for Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LEON W. ROBINSON and
ARLENE ROBINSON,

)
)
)

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants,

KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

]
]
]1

]
]
J
]
]

vs.

]

DENNIS VANCE,

]

Third Party Defendant.

Civil No. 920902754

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

)
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This matter came on regularly before the Court for trial on June 1, 1994, the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District Court Judge, presiding. Kent L. Christiansen of the law
firm of Christiansen & Sonntag, appeared on behalf of the Defendants, Kerry Rick Hubble and
Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. Scott Mitchell of the law firm of Lehman, Mitchell &
Waldo, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs, Leon and Arlene Robinson. Dennis Blaine Vance
appeared pro se at the trial. The parties having adduced evidence by way of testimony and
documentary exhibits, and having argued the matter to the Court, and the Court having reviewed
the file, exhibits, and memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court being fully advised in the
premises, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court initially entered its original Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 20, 1994.
Thereafter, on January 13, 1995, the matter again came before the court for hearing on
various motions of the parties, including Third-Party Plaintiffs Countermotion for Compensatory
Damages against Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance. Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm
of Christiansen & Sonntag, appeared on behalf of the Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. and Kerry Rick Hubble. Scott B. Mitchell appeared on
behalf of the Plaintiffs, Leon W. and Arlene Robinson. Michael G. Barker appeared on behalf
of Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance. The parties having submitted legal Memoranda, and
having filed various motions and other documents in support of their respective positions, the
Court having reviewed the testimony and documentary exhibits presented to the Court, and the
parties having argued the matter to the Court, the Court having considered the arguments of the
parties, and now being fully advised in the premises enters the following:
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 22, 1988, an Amended Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs,

Leon W. Robinson and Arlene Robinson, and against Kerry Rick Hubble in the Third Judicial
District Court, Case No. C87-3023.

The total principal amount of the judgment was

$27,280.56.
2.

Subsequent thereto, Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Blaine Vance, contacted

Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. and offered his services as a "paralegal" and collection agent.
3.

Vance was hired as an independent contractor by Wilderness Building Systems

to collect various delinquent accounts.
4.

Vance thereafter learned that Leon W. and Arlene Robinson had a judgment

against Kerry Rick Hubble in the amount of $27,280.56 which appeared as a judgment lien
against Lot J-63 in Summit Park Subdivision.
5.

Vance was interested in acquiring Lot J-63 and explored the possibility of

purchasing it.
6.

Vance offered his services to Wilderness Building Systems, indicating that he

could clear the encumbrances and liens which appeared of record against Lot J-63.
7.

Vance initially arranged a meeting with a prospective buyer for Lot J-63 at the

law offices of Gerald Conder.
8.

Due to the fact that Mr. Conder had previously done work for Kerry Rick

Hubble, he indicated that he believed there was a conflict of interest and declined to proceed
further.
9.

On or about January 27, 1992, Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Blaine Vance,
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contacted attorney James T. Dunn and requested him to file a Complaint for Reformation of a
mortgage between Hubble and Gneiting in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit
County, State of Utah; Civil No. 92-11322. The Complaint purportedly identified Kay Gneiting
as the Plaintiff and the Defendants were identified as Kerry Rick Hubble, Leon and Arlene
Robinson, and a person claiming an equitable lien on the subject Summit County property, an
individual by the name of Jim Quinn.
10.

Defendants, Kerry Rick Hubble, Kay Gneiting and Wilderness Building Systems,

were not advised concerning Third-Party Defendant Dennis Blaine Vance's actions relative to
the foreclosure complaint, nor did any of them meet with Attorney Dunn to pursue the
foreclosure action.
11.

The foreclosure action alleged that a "Mortgage" filed of record in the Summit

County Recorder's Office on November 3, 1987, identifying Gneiting as mortgagor and Hubble
as mortgagee, was prepared in error.
12.

In the First Cause of Action of the Foreclosure Action, the Complaint asserted

a claim for reformation alleging the existence of a mortgage, and further alleging that:
Neither [Gneiting] nor [Hubble] were represented by counsel or a title company
and the mortgage is prepared incorrectly. Kerry R. Hubble should show as the
mortgagor and the person obligated to make payment and Kay Gneiting should
show as the mortgagee to whom money is owed.
13.

In the Second Cause of Action in the Foreclosure Action, the Complaint asserted

a claim for "Mortgage Foreclosure", alleging the existence of the Mortgage, that Gneiting should
be the Mortgagee and Hubble the Mortgagor, and that:
The Defendant Hubble has failed to make payment of the $37,000.00, together
with interest at the pre-judgment rate of 10% per annum, and there is now due
and owing ... the sum of $53,421.92.
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14.

In the Third Cause of Action in the Foreclosure Action, the Complaint asserted

a claim for "Quiet Title", alleging that:
All of the right title and interest of [Gneiting] to the [Summit County Property]
is superior to the claim of all other parties Defendant [including the Robinsons]...
15.

After filing the Foreclosure Action, the attorney retained by Dennis Vance

contacted the Robinsons, falsely represented to them that Gneiting's interest in the property was
superior to theirs, and offered to pay the Robinsons $2,500.00 to release their judgment lien
against the Summit County Property. In reliance upon that representation, the Robinsons, in
fact, released their judgment lien.
16.

Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance, concocted, engaged in, and orchestrated

a scheme to defraud the Robinsons, Hubble, Gneiting, and Wilderness Building Systems,
knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and with reckless disregard for their rights.
17.

Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance's conduct has had a devastating affect upon

the lives of the Robinsons, Kerry Rick Hubble, and Kay Gneiting, and has significantly harmed
Wilderness Building Systems, Inc.
18.

As a consequence of Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance's actions, the

Robinsons were forced to file a Petition for Relief in the Bankruptcy Court; Kerry Rick Hubble,
Kay Gneiting and Wilderness Building Systems, have had judgment rendered against them and
in favor of the Robinsons, including punitive damages.
19.

Vance inappropriately charged Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. $816.00 for his

alleged services, for which he was paid $816.00 by Wilderness Building Systems, Inc.
20.

In or about May, 1992, Vance had a significant falling out with Wilderness

Building Systems and threatened to "get back at them."
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21.

Vance contacted the Robinsons and advised them that Wilderness had undertaken

a scheme to defraud them of their judgment lien against Lot J-63.
22.

He agreed to provide them information about the scheme in exchange for a

percentage of the money they might stand to collect from Wilderness Building Systems and
Hubble.
23.

Vance also made terroristic threats against Wilderness Building Systems

employees, and was subsequently convicted of "making terroristic threats" in a separate criminal
action.
24.

Vance also failed to pay James T. Dunn for his services rendered in connection

with Lot J-63.
25.

James T. Dunn filed a lawsuit and obtained a judgment against Dennis Vance for

those legal fees. Vance is the only individual or entity against whom collection of those fees
were sought.
26.

Vance also took and converted to his own use customer files and accounts

belonging to Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., having a value of $9,800.00.
Despite repeated demands by Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., for the return of said
files, Vance refused to provide the files and accounts he had wrongfully removed.
27.

Prior to the June 1, 1994 trial of this matter, on May 18, 1994, Dennis Vance

contacted Kevin Gneiting by telephone and attempted to persuade Gneiting to change his
testimony concerning this case in exchange a promise that Gneiting would bear no liability in
the outcome of the Robinsons' claim against him. Gneiting refused to change his testimony.
28.

Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Blaine Vance's relative wealth is substantially in
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excess of iru- c- the Robinsons, ka\ (lnni-nj' and Keny Rick Hubble.
29.

r
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lis Vance, has steadfastly refused to acknowledge any

wi ongdoing in this case, despite the fact that the fraud Inn ipcrpinifcd upon all of the n;»^
this case is manifest, 1 he fact that Dennis Vance has shown no remorse, regret, oi repentance
c

engage in similar conduct in thr future.
. 30.,-. Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance, engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the
Robinsons, Hubble, Gneitinp, and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc
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which amot > represents monies wrongfully obtained by Viiiur
Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., should also be
awarded damages against Dennis Blaine Vance in the amount of $9,800.00 for the wrongful
conversion of customer files and accounts to his own use.
34.

An award

'

$24,780

in favor of Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc ii i order to punish Thirdm engaging ii i like conduct in tl ic
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future.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes that Kerry Rick Hubble
and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. should be awarded compensatory damages in the amount
of $24,780.56, together with prejudgment interest in the amount of $16,583.97, and
postjudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum from April 21, 1993, until paid; for damages
relating to monies wrongfully received by Vance in the amount of $816.00; damages in the
amount of $9,800.00 on the conversion claim; and punitive damages in the amount of
$24,780.56 in order to punish Dennis Blaine Vance, and deter him from engaging in similar
conduct in the future.
DATED this

day of January, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

Homer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Findings
of J act ant! ' \ • • '

•,

•' !

' | ;»):KI)V • !'ir I.,'I,' :orur\ copy thereof in the U.S. Mails,

postage prepaid, this l£_ day of January, r^S, and properly addressed as follows:
Scott B. Mitchell
Attorney at Law
Suite 620
8 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael G. Barker
Attorney at Law
56 E. Broadway, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(^zhLu^•:..!.- \J\kt(k^
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KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN of CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG t 1 *!
i £ >U '-<J
345 IBM Plaza
420 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-3762

Bv.
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Attorneys for Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

LEON W. ROBINSON and
ARLENE ROBINSON,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintitls,
vs.

KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants,

r i v i i '"In '»,HM)J'M

K A V GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS VANCE,
Third Party Defendant.

Judge Homer P. Wilkinson

This matter came on regularly before the Court for a non-jury trial on the Third-Party
Complaint filed by Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, against Third-Party
Defendant, Dennis Vance, on June 1, 1994, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District
Court Judge, presiding.

Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm of Christiansen & Sonntag,

appeared on behalf of the Defendants, Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc.
Scott Mitchell of the law firm of Lehman, Mitchell & Waldo, appeared on behalf of the
Plaintiffs, Leon and Arlene Robinson. Dennis Blaine Vance appeared pro se at the trial. The
parties having adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary exhibits, and having
argued the matter to the Court, and the Court having reviewed the file, exhibits, and memoranda
submitted by the parties, the Court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause
appearing therefore, the Court initially entered Judgment on October 20, 1994.
Thereafter, on January 13, 1995, the matter again came before the court for hearing on
various motions of the parties, including Third-Party Plaintiffs Countermotion for Compensatory
Damages against Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance. Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm
of Christiansen & Sonntag, appeared on behalf of the Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. and Kerry Rick Hubble. Scott B. Mitchell appeared on
behalf of the Plaintiffs, Leon W. and Arlene Robinson. Michael G. Barker appeared on behalf
of Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance. The parties having submitted legal Memoranda, and
having filed various motions and other documents in support of their respective positions, the
Court having reviewed the testimony and documentary exhibits presented to the Court, and the
parties having argued the matter to the Court, the Court having considered the arguments of the
parties, having entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and now being
fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment U|MIH ilu. mrnis IK* entered •
in favor of the Third-Party Plaintiffs ke,
and against Thm

P Hnhiiit and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc.,

-v TVfendant, Dennis Vance, for compensatory damages in I In amount of

$24,780.56, together with prejudgment interest in the
interest at the rate <

and postjudgment

MM « <n^ April 21, 1993, until paid; for damages relating to

monies wrongfully received by Vance in the amount of $gi6.00; for o« .
$9,800.00 on the conversion claim; and j.-

trhe amount of

in the amount of $24,780.56; together

with interest on each of 'the above amounts as allowed by Utah Code Annotated
DATED this / J day of J&mxary, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

' T" T^b?*^-

omer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge

\c

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Judgment
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this l?) day of
January, 1995, and properly addressed as follows:
Scott B. Mitchell
Attorney at Law
Suite 620
8 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael G. Barker
Attorney at Law
56 E. Broadway, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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the ground for objection. Godesky v. Provo City
Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).
An objection couched in language such as
"the instruction is not suggested by and is contrary to law," or like terms, lacks the specificity required by this rule. Morgan v. Quailbrook
Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985).
Timeliness of objections.
Objections to instructions would be considered on appeal even though the objections were
not made until after the jury retired because
the judge did not afford counsel the opportunity to enter objections on the record before
that time. Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830
P.2d 270 (Utah 1992).
Written instructions.
-Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
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Cited in Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377'
P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d
296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. Christensen,
15 Utah 2d 182,389 P.2d 734 (1964); Memmott
v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 356, 453 P.2d 155
(1969); Telford v. Newell J. Olsen & Sons
Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480 P.2d 462
(1971), Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. Co., 29
Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973); Henderson
v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v.
Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall,
671 P.2d 201 (Utah 1983); Highland Constr.
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1984); Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah
1986); Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah
1987); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah
1987); State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770
P.2d 131 (Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806
P.2d 744 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991);
Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
817 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Russell v.
Russell, 852 P.2d 997 (Utah 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Ju- -J-.i
7f>A Am. Jur. 2d Trial
Is1"""' er seq
* J.S. - 88 C J S. Trial §§ 266 to 448.
It - Propriety and prejudicial effect of
-. ..^iJens in civil case as affected by the
manner m which they «re written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
&

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or an
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
r.Miqt ruction of statutes or rules .making
v the use of pattern or uniform ap'- instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A.L.R.3d 101.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 51, and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial *» 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect, In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review>Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
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Rule 52

conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
—Motion.
Caption.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.
Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Criminal contempt.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
—Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judgments upon multiple claims or parties.
Judicial review.
—Equity cases.

—Standard of review.
Conclusions of law.
Criminal cases.
Criminal trials.
Findings of facts by jury.
Intent.
Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.
Sufficiency.
—Allegations of pleadings.
—Burden on appeal.
—Found insufficient.
Vacation of judgment.
—Found sufficient.
—Opinion or memorandum of decision.
—Recitals of procedures.
—Technical error.
—Ultimate facts.
Summary judgment.
—Statement of grounds.
Waiver.
—Failure of court.
When filed.
—Tardy filing.
Cited.
Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract
In a contract action by a real estate broker
for his commission, where the defendant raises
the issue of abandonment of the contract by his
answer, the court should make findings on the
issue of abandonment. Failure of the trial court
to make findings of fact on all material issues
is reversible error where it is prejudicial.
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278
P.2d 284 (1954).
—Advisory verdict
The trial court has the responsibility to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law,
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Rule 59

creditor to satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered upon the docket
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction ofjudgrm ... ...... cuted and acknowledged, the clerk shall file the same with the papers \r t.h«
case, and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of
the judgment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaction.
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall have been satisfied, in
whole or in part, or as to any judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered
upon the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such
satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and
shall direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only
from the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the
county where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment
may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket
shall be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same
effect as in the county where the same was originally entered.
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal
rule covering this subject matter,
I'MMI'i,1 T"" DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Accep m i i • '

: n

« v m r- rit.

~ ?c
Attachment.
Vacation of satisfaction
,
f r ii
*
A
p . c e o u pH.\ men .
—Effect.
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full payment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge everything merged in and adjudicated
by the judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith
O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P.2d 943 (1916).
COLLATERAL
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 1004 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574to584:,
• A.L.R.
Voluntary payment into court of

Attachment.

Court had duty to make order directing partial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding.
B k k e y F a r r e l l 3 1 U t a h 1 1 0 8 6 p 8 0 5 (1906).
Vacation of satisfaction.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the lien
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judgment does not include his personal right to execute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V.
Fed. Credit Union v Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1974).
REFERENCES
judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re
lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment,
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
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finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Harmless error not
ground for new trial, Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Caption on motion for new trial.
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
Costs.
Decision against law.
Discretion of trial court.
Effect of order granting new trial.
Effect of untimely motion.
Evidence.
Sufficiency.
Excessive or inadequate damages.
Punitive damages.
Failure to object to findings of fact.
Filing of affidavits.
Grounds for new trial.
—Particularization in motion.
Incompetence or negligence of counsel.
Misconduct of jury.
Motion to alter or amend judgment.
Motion to be presented to trial court.
Newly discovered evidence.
New trial on initiative of court.
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial,
Reconsideration of motion for new trial.

Settlement bars appeal.
Summary judgment.
£ime for motion.
Tolling time for appeal.
Waiver.
Cited.
Abandonment of motion.
Abandonment of motion for new trial must
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d
iQ43 (Utah 1984).
Accident or surprise.
This section requires that the moving party
show
&** ordinary prudence was exercised to
guard against the accident or surprise. Powers
v
- Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174
(Utah 1977).
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of
the defendant's expert witness where the
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either
before, or immediately after, it was given.
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977).
A "surprise" at trial which could have been
easily guarded against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3).

